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Despu\u00e9s de la crisis financiera asi\u00e1tica, una nueva divisi\u00f3n comenz\u00f3 a volverse evidente en el mundo. De un lado, estaban los denominados pa\u00edses en \u201cd\u00e9ficit\u201d y, del otro, los pa\u00edses en \u201csuper\u00e1vit\u201d.<\/P>
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Mientras los primeros -principalmente Estados Unidos y Reino Unido- estaban importando m\u00e1s de lo que estaban exportando y solicitando pr\u00e9stamos a otros pa\u00edses para cubrir la brecha, los \u00faltimos -principalmente China- estaban en una buena posici\u00f3n en una ola de super\u00e1vits comerciales y prestando dinero a los pa\u00edses en d\u00e9ficit.<\/P>
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![\"\"](\"\/sites\/default\/files\/ESP_rodrigo_aravena_CVDIC2010.jpg\")
Esa tendencia fue interrumpida de manera temporal por la recesi\u00f3n del a\u00f1o pasado. Ella no s\u00f3lo redujo de manera dr\u00e1stica la demanda por importaciones en los pa\u00edses en d\u00e9ficit, tambi\u00e9n trajo consigo una apreciaci\u00f3n del d\u00f3lar debido a que -de manera nada l\u00f3gica, dado que la crisis tuvo su origen en Estados Unidos- los inversionistas se volcaron al d\u00f3lar como refugio en tiempos de incertidumbre.<\/P>
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Sin embargo, desde mediados del 2009, el d\u00f3lar nuevamente se ha depreciado frente a la mayor parte de las dem\u00e1s monedas, lo que refleja una incremento de confianza de los inversionistas -si bien a\u00fan vol\u00e1til- y la d\u00e9bil recuperaci\u00f3n estadounidense. Y las tensiones han ido aumentando.<\/P>
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A los gobiernos en mercados emergentes no les gustan los aumentos repentinos en su tasa de cambio, en particular frente al d\u00f3lar, la moneda en la que se efect\u00faa la mayor\u00eda del comercio internacional, y la resultante p\u00e9rdida de competitividad internacional. Y levantan un dedo acusador a China.<\/P>
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Su queja es que, con el fin de impulsar el crecimiento exportador, la naci\u00f3n asi\u00e1tica se reh\u00fasa a permitir que el yuan -cuya tasa de cambio frente al d\u00f3lar ha estado fija desde el 2007- suba de manera acorde con los indicadores fundamentales de la econom\u00eda. Destacan que el crecimiento de China est\u00e1 en auge -y, por tanto, as\u00ed deber\u00edan estar tambi\u00e9n sus importaciones- pero contin\u00faa registrando un enorme super\u00e1vit comercial.<\/P>
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El d\u00e9bil yuan, por otra parte, s\u00f3lo aumenta m\u00e1s la presi\u00f3n alcista sobre las divisas de mercados emergentes que, como Chile, tienen una tasa de cambio flotante. En una reciente columna de opini\u00f3n en Financial Times, el ministro de Hacienda de Chile, Felipe Larra\u00edn, inst\u00f3 a China a mostrar m\u00e1s flexibilidad cambiaria con el fin de \u201ccompartir con sus socios comerciales de mercados emergentes una parte m\u00e1s proporcional de la carga del ajuste cambiario global que est\u00e1 en marcha ahora\u201d.<\/P>
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Estados Unidos tambi\u00e9n est\u00e1 molesto con la pol\u00edtica cambiaria de China y ha instado de manera reiterada a una mayor flexibilidad. En junio, China -de hecho- acord\u00f3 flexibilizar la tasa fija de cambio yuan-d\u00f3lar, pero no lo suficiente para satisfacer a sus cr\u00edticos y sus pol\u00edticas comerciales \u201cinjustas\u201d fueron un tema \u00e1lgido en las recientes elecciones legislativas estadounidenses.<\/P>
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Tanto en Washington como a nivel internacional, se ha hablado de imponer sanciones en contra de pa\u00edses que \u201cmanipulen\u201d su tasa de cambio (si bien no est\u00e1 claro c\u00f3mo podr\u00edan implementarse tales sanciones). M\u00e1s a\u00fan, aunque la represalia comercial a\u00fan parece una posibilidad distante, el riesgo de que la actual supuesta \u201cguerra de divisas\u201d pueda convertirse en una guerra comercial muy real no puede descartarse.<\/P>
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Flujos de Capital <\/STRONG><\/P> En tanto, a los pa\u00edses emergentes tambi\u00e9n les molesta la decisi\u00f3n de la Reserva Federal de Estados Unidos de lanzar una segunda ronda de flexibilizaci\u00f3n cuantitativa -o QE2, como se le conoce en ingl\u00e9s- seg\u00fan la cual planea comprar US$600 millones en bonos del gobierno con dinero reci\u00e9n impreso. Los mercados emergentes tendieron a ver esta resoluci\u00f3n como una medida de Estados Unidos para estimular su econom\u00eda a trav\u00e9s de una mayor devaluaci\u00f3n del d\u00f3lar<\/P> No obstante, seg\u00fan Vladimir Werning, director ejecutivo de JP Morgan, ellos est\u00e1n equivocados. La QE2 est\u00e1 dise\u00f1ada para reducir los costos financieros y elevar los precios de los activos en un contexto en el que la Reserva Federal no tiene espacio para nuevas reducciones a la tasa de inter\u00e9s, afirma.<\/P> Sin embargo, la segunda ronda de flexibilizaci\u00f3n cuantitativa ha generado temores en las econom\u00edas emergentes bien administradas de un influjo de capitales en busca de mayores rendimientos que aquellos disponibles en Estados Unidos o, de hecho, en la mayor\u00eda de los dem\u00e1s pa\u00edses industrializados. Guido Mantega de Brasil fue particularmente cr\u00edtico, equiparando la medida con lanzar \u201cdinero desde un helic\u00f3ptero\u201d y argumentando que implicaba el riesgo de burbujas de activos alrededor del mundo.<\/P> El ingreso de capitales no es malo en s\u00ed mismo, destaca Alberto Ramos. De hecho, puede ser bueno para una econom\u00eda en desarrollo si se va a los mercados de bonos y acciones, reduciendo por tanto el costo del financiamiento para las empresas.<\/P> Pero tiene que ser \u201cdigerido de manera apropiada\u201d, a\u00f1ade. Y ello podr\u00eda requerir requisitos m\u00e1s estrictos para los pr\u00e9stamos bancarios -como los introducidos recientemente, por ejemplo, en Israel y Singapur- para resguardarse en contra de una burbuja crediticia.<\/P> No obstante, los mercados emergentes tienden a estar temerosos de los flujos de capital, ya sea porque su nivel en s\u00ed mismo puede ser desestabilizante para una econom\u00eda peque\u00f1a o porque pueden desaparecer tan r\u00e1pidamente como llegaron. Hasta ahora, en Chile, no han sido significativos -\u201cno es la mejor recompensa para operaciones de carry trade y su mercado burs\u00e1til es limitado\u201d, destaca Ramos-, pero otros pa\u00edses han comenzado a tomar medidas defensivas.<\/P> En octubre, Brasil elev\u00f3 el impuesto a las compras extranjeras de su deuda interna y Tailandia introdujo un impuesto de retenci\u00f3n del 15% a los inversionistas extranjeros en sus bonos. Luego, en noviembre, Taiw\u00e1n les sigui\u00f3 con la imposici\u00f3n de l\u00edmites a la posesi\u00f3n de bonos por parte de extranjeros.<\/P> La experiencia -incluida la de Chile en la d\u00e9cada de los 90- sugiere que tales medidas son, en el mejor de los casos, parches. Es m\u00e1s, podr\u00edan marcar el inicio de lo que el ministro de Hacienda Larra\u00edn describi\u00f3 en su columna en el Financial Times como \u201cun ciclo destructivo de intervenci\u00f3n cambiaria y controles de capital\u201d.<\/P> El problema subyacente es el descontento con el actual sistema monetario internacional. Dado que este emplea al d\u00f3lar como su moneda de reserva, vuelve a otros pa\u00edses vulnerables -para bien o para mal- a la pol\u00edtica monetaria estadounidense y, cuando el d\u00f3lar se debilita, a una p\u00e9rdida en el valor de sus reservas internacionales.<\/P> El debate sobre una reforma no es nuevo -ha estado en curso desde que el sistema de la posguerra de Bretton Woods de tasas de cambio esencialmente fijas colaps\u00f3 a comienzos de la d\u00e9cada de los 70-, pero las opciones son limitadas. No hay ninguna regla que diga que el mundo tiene que tener una \u00fanica moneda de reserva -hasta 1914, hab\u00eda tres (la libra esterlina, el franco suizo y el marco alem\u00e1n)- y la alternativa obvia ser\u00eda incorporar al euro.<\/P> Antes de la recesi\u00f3n del a\u00f1o pasado, muchos bancos centrales estaban, de hecho, diversific\u00e1ndose en euros, destaca Vladimir Werning de JP Morgan, pero con la crisis volvieron a los d\u00f3lares. M\u00e1s a\u00fan, la zona del euro todav\u00eda tiene importantes problemas de salud a tal punto que hay quienes dudan si en, digamos, 10 a\u00f1os plazo, el euro seguir\u00e1 existiendo.<\/P> Panorama Latinoamericano<\/STRONG><\/P> En tanto, los gobiernos latinoamericanos y los bancos centrales tendr\u00e1n que lidiar con el hecho de m\u00e1s corto plazo de que, dado el s\u00f3lido crecimiento de sus pa\u00edses comparado con el letargo de los pa\u00edses industrializados, es posible que sus monedas tambi\u00e9n se mantengan fuertes y podr\u00edan apreciarse incluso m\u00e1s en comparaci\u00f3n con el d\u00f3lar. Para algunos, ese ser\u00e1 un problema m\u00e1s grande que los dem\u00e1s.<\/P> Para Per\u00fa, el desaf\u00edo es particularmente complejo, afirma Alberto Ramos. Debido a que su econom\u00eda est\u00e1 altamente dolarizada, las variaciones en la tasa de cambio f\u00e1cilmente pueden crear distorsiones en otras \u00e1reas de la econom\u00eda, destaca, si bien a\u00f1ade que el enfoque de la pol\u00edtica de Per\u00fa hasta ahora, que ha incluido un aumento de los requisitos de reserva sobre los cr\u00e9ditos internacionales de corto plazo, apunta en la direcci\u00f3n correcta.<\/P> \u201cNadie le est\u00e1 pidiendo a Brasil que recorte su gasto fiscal, sino que simplemente que desacelere su expansi\u00f3n\u201d, afirma. \u201cLos controles de capital son sencillamente la respuesta f\u00e1cil a la alternativa de arreglar ese problema\u201d.<\/P> En Chile, no hay contradicciones similares de pol\u00edtica, se\u00f1ala Vladimir Werning. Es cierto que el gasto fiscal ha aumentado con relaci\u00f3n al PIB, pero eso es en parte el resultado de los esfuerzos de reconstrucci\u00f3n posteriores al terremoto y el debate sobre el problema de la tasa de cambio est\u00e1 \u201cm\u00e1s avanzado\u201d que en la mayor parte de los dem\u00e1s pa\u00edses de la regi\u00f3n, afirma.<\/P> M\u00e1s a\u00fan, el peso se ha apreciado mucho menos en t\u00e9rminos reales frente a una cesta ponderada de divisas que en t\u00e9rminos nominales frente al d\u00f3lar, destaca Rodrigo Aravena. De acuerdo con ello, la tasa de cambio no est\u00e1 significativamente fuera de su promedio de los \u00faltimos 10 a\u00f1os ni tampoco muy por sobre su promedio de 20 a\u00f1os, destaca.<\/P> A\u00fan as\u00ed, existe preocupaci\u00f3n a lo largo de la regi\u00f3n de que las s\u00f3lidas divisas, junto con los reinantes altos precios para las exportaciones de bienes b\u00e1sicos, podr\u00edan amenazar la diversificaci\u00f3n de las exportaciones y los empleos que ha creado. Algo de reincidencia ya es evidente y la Comisi\u00f3n Econ\u00f3mica para Am\u00e9rica Latina y el Caribe (Cepal) de las Naciones Unidas estima que los bienes b\u00e1sicos correspondieron a poco m\u00e1s de un cuarto de las exportaciones de la regi\u00f3n a fines de la d\u00e9cada de los 90, menos de la mitad de a comienzos de los a\u00f1os 80, pero -para el per\u00edodo comprendido entre el 2008 y el 2009- de nuevo estaban cerca del 40%.<\/P> A juicio de Werning, algunos pa\u00edses -principalmente Brasil, pero no Chile, pese al reciente aumento de los precios del cobre- podr\u00edan enfrentar el riesgo de un ataque de la denominada enfermedad holandesa en la que la apreciaci\u00f3n de la divisa y el precio de una exportaci\u00f3n particular -lo que ocurri\u00f3 con el gas natural en Holanda en la d\u00e9cada de los sesenta- socavaron fatalmente la competitividad de otras exportaciones. En ese caso, podr\u00edan justificarse algunas medidas de apoyo espec\u00edficas por sector, sugiere Werning, siempre y cuando ellas se mantengan dentro de las normas de la Organizaci\u00f3n Mundial de Comercio.<\/P> \u201cDe cara a problemas en un sector particular, las medidas micro son m\u00e1s saludables que las medidas macro como los controles de capital\u201d, insiste. Sin embargo, como reconoce, eso resulta cierto s\u00f3lo si esos sectores son competitivos en el largo plazo.<\/P> Y ese es el tema clave que enfrenta la regi\u00f3n hoy en d\u00eda. En algunos a\u00f1os m\u00e1s, \u00bfparecer\u00e1n la actual fortaleza de sus monedas s\u00f3lo una aberraci\u00f3n temporal o est\u00e1 aqu\u00ed para quedarse? Sus industrias de exportaci\u00f3n esperan que lo primero sea cierto, pero s\u00f3lo por si a caso, har\u00edan bien en concentrarse en la \u00fanica respuesta duradera a la competitividad: aumentos en la productividad.<\/P> Ruth Bradley<\/STRONG> es la corresponsal en Santiago de The Economist.<\/P> It was Guido Mantega, Brazil\u2019s finance minister, who first suggested in September that the world is embroiled in a \u201ccurrency war\u201d. No-one has since seemed able to define the term – when asked to do so, officials from both the United States and China, the main protagonists in the supposed war, declined – but it hardly matters.<\/p>\n The tensions are evident. So too is the frustration of emerging markets around the world as, in what they see as collateral damage, their currencies appreciate against the dollar at the expense of the competitiveness of the exports that, in many cases, drive their economies.<\/p>\n In Chile, farmers particularly have felt the pinch. In a recent poll by the National Agricultural Society (SNA), the industry association, 38% of those surveyed reported having postponed investments and a further 9% said they had stopped them altogether.<\/p>\n The main culprit, they said, is the exchange rate – now running at around 480 pesos\/dollar, down from 540 pesos a few months ago and an average of 560 pesos last year – and its impact on their margins. But it\u2019s not just the present level of the exchange rate that worries them – farmers are, after all, used to lean as well as fat years – it\u2019s also the unlikely prospect that the peso will weaken much in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n Their fears are well grounded, according to Alberto Ramos, managing director and co-head of Latin American economics at Goldman Sachs in New York. He expects the exchange rate to remain flat at around 480 pesos\/dollar through to the end of next year.<\/p>\n And there is precious little that the Chilean authorities can do about it, although the Central Bank has reduced the speed at which it was increasing interest rates and the government of Sebasti\u00e1n Pi\u00f1era, Chile\u2019s president since March, has announced some palliative measures such as increased access to hedging instruments.<\/p>\n Part of the \u2018problem\u2019 is Chile\u2019s strong growth. Rebounding quickly from its contraction last year and the destruction and disruptions of the February earthquake, growth surged to 7% in the third quarter and, according to average local forecasts, will reach 6% next year before cooling to a (still strong) 5.5% in 2012.<\/p>\n As Central Bank governor, Jos\u00e9 De Gregorio, has pointed out, a strong economy generally means a strong currency. But that is not the whole – or, indeed, main – story.<\/p>\n According to Rodrigo Aravena, chief economist at Banchile Inversiones, a local asset management and stockbrokerage company, only 20% of the peso\u2019s appreciation since mid-year can be explained by domestic decisions – such as tighter monetary policy and the placement of two sovereign bonds – and 80% is the result of factors over which Chile has little control, principally the price of copper, its main export, and the global depreciation of the dollar. <\/p>\n That is the crux of the problem. It is not so much the peso that has strengthened as the dollar that has weakened and, although partly the result of efforts by the United States to revive its flagging economy, that is a trend which predates last year\u2019s international recession. <\/p>\n Trade imbalances<\/strong><\/p>\n After the Asian financial crisis, a new division began to become apparent in the world. On the one side, there were the so-called \u201cdeficit\u201d countries and, on the other, the \u201csurplus\u201d countries.<\/p>\n While the former – principally the United States and the United Kingdom – were importing more than they exported and borrowing from other countries to cover the gap, the latter – principally China – were riding high on a tide of trade balance surpluses and lending the money to deficit countries.<\/p>\n But, since mid-2009, the dollar has again depreciated against most other currencies, reflecting both stronger – if still volatile – investor confidence and weak U.S. recovery. And tensions have been mounting.<\/p>\n Governments in emerging markets do not take kindly to sudden increases in their exchange rate, particularly against the dollar, the currency in which most international trade is conducted, and the resulting loss of international competitiveness. And they point a finger of blame at China.<\/p>\n Their complaint is that, in order to drive export growth, it is refusing to allow the yuan – which has been pegged to the dollar since 2007 – to rise in line with the economy\u2019s fundamentals. They point out that China\u2019s growth is booming – and so too, therefore, should be its imports – but it continues to run a huge trade surplus.<\/p>\n The weak yuan, moreover, only further increases upward pressure on the currencies of other emerging markets that, like Chile, have a floating exchange rate. In a recent opinion column in the Financial Times, Chile\u2019s finance minister, Felipe Larra\u00edn, called on China to show more exchange-rate flexibility in order to \u201cshare with its emerging market trading partners a more proportional part of the burden of the global currency adjustment that is now underway.\u201d<\/p>\n The United States too is annoyed with China\u2019s exchange-rate policy and has repeatedly urged more flexibility. In June, China did, in fact, agree to loosen the yuan-dollar peg, but not by enough to satisfy critics, and its \u201cunfair\u201d trade policies were a hot issue in the recent U.S. mid-term elections.<\/p>\n Both in Washington, and internationally, there has been talk of sanctions against countries that \u201cmanipulate\u201d their exchange rate (although it is not clear how such sanctions could be enforced). Moreover, although trade retaliation still seems a distant prospect, the risk that the current putative \u201ccurrency war\u201d could become a very real trade war cannot be ruled out.<\/p>\n Capital flows<\/strong><\/p>\n Meanwhile, emerging countries are also annoyed with the decision of the U.S. Federal Reserve to launch a second round of quantitative easing – the so-called QE2 – under which it plans to buy US$600 million in government bonds with freshly-printed money. Emerging markets have tended to see this as a move by the U.S. to stimulate its economy by further devaluing the dollar.<\/p>\n But, according to Vladimir Werning, executive director of JP Morgan, they are mistaken. QE2 is designed, he says, to reduce financial costs and raise asset prices in a context in which the Federal Reserve has no space for further interest rate reductions. <\/p>\n However, QE2 has raised fears in well-managed emerging economies of an influx of capital in search of higher yields than those available in the United States or, indeed, most other industrialized countries. Brazil\u2019s Guido Mantega was particularly critical, likening the measure to throwing \u201cmoney from a helicopter\u201d and arguing that it entailed the risk of asset bubbles around the world.<\/p>\n Capital inflow is not bad in itself, points out Alberto Ramos. Indeed, it can be good for a developing economy if it goes into the bond and equity markets, thereby reducing the cost of financing for local companies.<\/p>\n But it has to be \u201cdigested properly,\u201d he adds. And that may call for tighter bank lending requirements – as introduced recently, for example, by Israel and Singapore – to guard against a credit bubble.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, emerging markets tend to be wary of capital flows, either because their level can in itself be destabilizing for a small economy or because they can disappear as quickly as they arrived. So far, in Chile, they have not been significant – \u201cit\u2019s still not the best reward for carry trade and its equity market is limited,\u201d notes Ramos – but other countries have started to take defensive measures.<\/p>\n In October, Brazil raised the tax on foreign purchases of its domestic debt and Thailand introduced a 15% withholding tax for foreign investors in its bonds. Then, in November, Taiwan went on to impose limits on bond holdings by foreigners.<\/p>\n Experience – including that of Chile in the 1990s – suggests that such measures are, at best, stopgaps. They could, moreover, mark the start of what Finance Minister Larra\u00edn referred to in his Financial Times column as \u201ca destructive cycle of currency intervention and capital controls.\u201d<\/p>\n The underlying problem is dissatisfaction with the present international monetary system. Because it uses the dollar as its reserve currency, it renders other countries vulnerable – for better or worse – to U.S. monetary policy and, when the dollar weakens, to a loss in the value of their international reserves.<\/p>\n Debate about reform is not new – it has been going on since the post-war Bretton Woods system of essentially fixed exchange rates fell apart in the early 1970s – but the options are limited. There is no rule which says that the world has to have a single reserve currency – until 1914, there were three (the British pound, the French franc and the German mark) – and the obvious alternative would be to incorporate the euro.<\/p>\n Before last year\u2019s recession, many central banks were, in fact, diversifying into euros, notes JP Morgan\u2019s Vladimir Werning, but, with the crisis, returned to dollars. Moreover, the euro zone still has important health problems to the extent that there are those who doubt whether in, say, ten years\u2019 time, the euro will still exist.<\/p>\n Latin American outlook<\/strong><\/p>\n Meanwhile, Latin American governments and central banks will have to grapple with the shorter-term fact that, given their countries\u2019 strong growth compared to the sluggishness of industrialized countries, their currencies are also likely to remain strong and could even appreciate further against the dollar. For some, that will be a bigger problem than for others.<\/p>\n For Peru, the challenge is particularly complex, says Alberto Ramos. Because its economy is so highly dollarized, exchange-rate variations can easily create distortions in other areas of the economy, he notes, although he adds that Peru\u2019s policy approach so far, which has included an increase in the reserve requirement on short-term overseas loans, points in the right direction.<\/p>\n \u201cNo-one is asking Brazil to cut fiscal spending but merely to slow its expansion,\u201d he says. \u201cCapital controls are just the easy answer to the alternative of fixing that problem.\u201d<\/p>\n In Chile, there aren\u2019t any similar policy contradictions, says Vladimir Werning. True, fiscal spending has increased as compared to GDP but that\u2019s partly the result of earthquake reconstruction and debate about the exchange-rate problem is \u201cmore advanced\u201d than in most other countries in the region, he says.<\/p>\n Moreover, the peso has appreciated far less in real terms against a trade-weighted basket of currencies than in nominal terms against the dollar, points out Rodrigo Aravena. On that count, the exchange rate is not, he notes, significantly out of line with its average for the last ten years nor much above its 20-year average.<\/p>\n Still, there is concern around the region that strong currencies, combined with the prevailing high prices for commodity exports, could threaten export diversification and the jobs it has created. Some backsliding is already apparent, with the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) estimating that commodities accounted for just over a quarter of the region\u2019s exports in the late 1990s, down from more than half in the early 1980s, but, by 2008-2009, were again back at close to 40%.<\/p>\n According to Werning, some countries – principally Brazil, but not Chile, despite the recent surge in copper prices – could risk a bout of the so-called Dutch disease in which currency appreciation and the price of a particular export – natural gas in Holland in the 1960s – fatally undermine the competitiveness of other exports. In that case, some sector-specific support measures may be justified, suggests Werning, providing they remain within World Trade Organization rules.<\/p>\n \u201cFaced with problems in a particular sector, micro measures are healthier than macro measures like capital controls,\u201d he insists. But, as he recognizes, that is true only if those sectors are competitive in the long run.<\/p>\n And that is the key question facing the region today. A few years on, will its present strong currencies look like just a temporary aberration or are they here to stay? Its export industries hope the former is true but, just in case, they would do well to focus on the only lasting answer to competitiveness – productivity gains.<\/p>\n Ruth Bradley<\/strong> is the Santiago correspondent of The Economist.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Fue Guido Mantega, el ministro de Hacienda de Brasil, el primero en sugerir en septiembre que el mundo estaba enfrascado en una \u201cguerra de divisas\u201d. Desde entonces, nadie ha parecido capaz de definir el t\u00e9rmino: cuando se les pidi\u00f3 que lo hicieran, los funcionarios tanto de Estados Unidos como de China -los principales protagonistas de la supuesta guerra- declinaron hacerlo, pero eso apenas importa.<\/P> Las tensiones son evidentes.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","news_tax":[],"user_type":[],"class_list":["post-4433","news","type-news","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
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\n![\"\"](\"\/sites\/default\/files\/ESP_Vladimir_Werning_CVDIC_2010.jpg\")
\u201cDada la ansiedad sobre la lenta recuperaci\u00f3n de Estados Unidos, es una medida razonable\u201d, sostiene. \u201cCiertamente, la debilidad del d\u00f3lar es un efecto colateral, pero no es el principal objetivo\u201d.<\/P>
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En algunos pa\u00edses, la pol\u00edtica interna tambi\u00e9n contribuy\u00f3 al fortalecimiento de la divisa local. Ese es el caso de Brasil, subraya Ramos, donde la pol\u00edtica fiscal est\u00e1 ayudando a mantener altas las tasas de inter\u00e9s y atraer capital de corto plazo en busca de un r\u00e1pido rendimiento.<\/P>
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That trend was temporarily interrupted by last year\u2019s recession. Not only did it sharply reduce demand for imports in deficit countries, it also brought with it an appreciation of the dollar as – counter-intuitively, given that the crisis had its origin in the U.S. – investors shifted into dollars as a safe haven in uncertain times.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"\/sites\/default\/files\/ING_Vladimir_Werning_CVDIC_2010.jpg\")
\u201cGiven anxiety about the slow U.S. recovery, it\u2019s a reasonable measure,\u201d he says. \u201cCertainly, weakness of the dollar is a side-effect but it\u2019s not the main objective.\u201d <\/p>\n![\"\"](\"\/sites\/default\/files\/ING_Alberto_ramos_CVDIC_2010.jpg\")
In some countries, domestic policy has also contributed to currency appreciation. That is the case of Brazil, notes Ramos, where fiscal policy is helping to keep interest rates high and attract short-term capital in search of a quick return.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"\/sites\/default\/files\/ING_tabla_dic_2010.jpg\")
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