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El directorio de Codelco aprob\u00f3 un plan de inversi\u00f3n de US$ 15.000 millones en los pr\u00f3ximos cinco a\u00f1os para incrementar la productividad, pero a\u00fan tiene que determinar de d\u00f3nde provendr\u00e1 este dinero.<\/P>
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Se supone que este plan incluir\u00e1 una inversi\u00f3n r\u00e9cord de US$ 2.400 millones este a\u00f1o, pero el Gobierno se ha negado a reinvertir US$ 378 millones de las ganancias de 2009 de Codelco, a ra\u00edz del costo de la reconstrucci\u00f3n tras el terremoto.<\/P>
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Codelco puede financiar cerca de US$ 1.600 millones de su plan de inversi\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de flujo de caja mediante la depreciaci\u00f3n del valor de sus activos, pero esto no es suficiente para cubrir todas las inversiones, se\u00f1ala Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/P>
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La empresa podr\u00eda recaudar fondos adicionales mediante la emisi\u00f3n de hasta US$ 500 millones en deuda o la venta de activos no esenciales, tales como su participaci\u00f3n del 40 por ciento en la generadora el\u00e9ctrica del norte de Chile E-CL, antes conocida como Edelnor, indica.<\/P>
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De esta manera, Codelco deber\u00eda financiar la cartera de inversi\u00f3n de este a\u00f1o sin reinvertir ninguna ganancia, pero el Gobierno tendr\u00e1 que reinvertir parte de las utilidades de la empresa en los pr\u00f3ximos a\u00f1os para financiar futuras inversiones.<\/P>
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\u201cReinvertir ganancias es una pr\u00e1ctica est\u00e1ndar en la industria minera\u201d, seg\u00fan Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/P>
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No obstante, los Gobiernos de Chile tienen un d\u00e9bil historial en cuanto a hacer justamente eso. Desde su creaci\u00f3n, a Codelco se le ha permitido reinvertir s\u00f3lo el 3% de sus ganancias.<\/P>
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Es necesario que ello cambie para evitar una dr\u00e1stica ca\u00edda en la producci\u00f3n de cobre y consecuentemente en el desempe\u00f1o financiero de Codelco, advierte Lagos.<\/P>
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Seg\u00fan el sitio web de Codelco, est\u00e1 previsto que grandes proyectos en sus minas El Teniente, Chuquicamata, Andina y Ministro Hales entren en producci\u00f3n en una r\u00e1pida sucesi\u00f3n a partir de la mitad de esta d\u00e9cada en adelante.<\/P>
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Si estos proyectos son exitosos, Codelco deber\u00eda poder aumentar su producci\u00f3n a cerca de dos millones de toneladas por a\u00f1o y asegurar as\u00ed la producci\u00f3n de la empresa por las pr\u00f3ximas d\u00e9cadas, afirma Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/P>
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\u201cTenemos que invertir ahora de manera que la producci\u00f3n pueda continuar en este nivel y con el tiempo aumente\u201d, sostiene.<\/P>
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Pese a la enorme tarea por delante, Hern\u00e1ndez conf\u00eda en que Codelco, con d\u00e9cadas de experiencia operacional a su haber, tiene las capacidades profesionales para tener \u00e9xito.<\/P>
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\u201cSomos los herederos de 105 a\u00f1os de tradici\u00f3n minera y conocimiento t\u00e9cnico, de modo que s\u00ed, tenemos la capacidad\u201d, a\u00f1ade.<\/P>
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Gobierno Corporativo<\/STRONG><\/P> Pero existe preocupaci\u00f3n en cuanto a que una falta de liderazgo independiente ha estado limitando a Codelco. Esto se debe en parte a las circunstancias que rodean la fundaci\u00f3n de la empresa.<\/P> El general Pinochet cre\u00f3 la empresa en 1976 principalmente a partir de los activos que fueron expropiados durante la nacionalizaci\u00f3n de las minas de cobre del pa\u00eds cinco a\u00f1os antes bajo el Gobierno de Salvador Allende.<\/P> Con un fuerte presidente ejecutivo en poder de casi todas las facultades, el directorio fue dise\u00f1ado para actuar m\u00e1s como asesores que como fiscalizadores. Este modelo result\u00f3 efectivo para consolidar las minas del pa\u00eds en la d\u00e9cada de los 70, pero dej\u00f3 poco espacio para las nociones corporativas modernas de transparencia y responsabilidad.<\/P> La responsabilidad del desempe\u00f1o de la empresa ahora recae en un directorio cuyos miembros se mantienen en el cargo por un per\u00edodo fijo con la facultad para contratar y despedir al presidente ejecutivo seg\u00fan consideren adecuado. Los ministros de Hacienda y Miner\u00eda ya no ocupan un puesto en el directorio de nueve miembros, que est\u00e1 compuesto por tres designados presidenciales balanceados por cuatro directores independientes, escogidos de la misma manera que los altos funcionarios p\u00fablicos, y dos representantes de los trabajadores.<\/P> La reforma no fue tan profunda como algunos hubieran querido. En la campa\u00f1a electoral, el Presidente Pi\u00f1era dijo que vender\u00eda una participaci\u00f3n del 20% de Codelco, se\u00f1alando que s\u00f3lo la incorporaci\u00f3n de capital privado podr\u00eda mejorar realmente la decreciente productividad de la empresa.<\/P> Chile no ser\u00eda el primer pa\u00eds en la regi\u00f3n en apuntar en esa direcci\u00f3n. En Brasil, la privatizaci\u00f3n parcial de la minera estatal CVRD, ahora rebautizada como Vale, y la petrolera Petrobras, ayudaron a transformarlas en gigantes globales.<\/P> No obstante, el Presidente Pi\u00f1era ha archivado este plan por ahora, al tiempo que inst\u00f3 a los trabajadores y los ejecutivos a construir \u201cuna Codelco del siglo XXI\u201d.<\/P> Los cambios en Codelco pueden parecer intangibles en comparaci\u00f3n con el trabajo sucio de tronadura y transporte de mineral, pero su potencial impacto no deber\u00eda subestimarse, en especial en lo que respecta a limitar la influencia pol\u00edtica, argumenta Guajardo.<\/P> Hasta ahora, sugiere, la lealtad pol\u00edtica ha sido un factor importante en las designaciones de Codelco \u201ccasi desde la sala del directorio hasta la pared rocosa\u201d.<\/P> Sin embargo, como resultado de su nuevo gobierno corporativo, las decisiones de Codelco deber\u00edan tomarse teniendo en mente s\u00f3lo lo que sea mejora para la compa\u00f1\u00eda, afirma Guajardo.<\/P> Bajo una Nueva Administraci\u00f3n<\/STRONG><\/P> A\u00fan se encuentra en sus primeros d\u00edas, pero las primeras designaciones del nuevo directorio han generado optimismo sobre el futuro de la empresa.<\/P> Los anteriores presidentes ejecutivos provinieron de la elite pol\u00edtica de Chile, pero Diego Hern\u00e1ndez se une a Codelco tras una exitosa carrera en el sector privado, que incluye per\u00edodos en los cuatro mayores grupos mineros del mundo: Anglo American, Rio Tinto, Vale y, m\u00e1s recientemente, BHP Billiton, donde encabez\u00f3 la divisi\u00f3n de metales base de la empresa.<\/P> Adem\u00e1s, el reci\u00e9n elegido presidente del directorio Gerardo Jofr\u00e9 es un ex ejecutivo bancario de Santander, quien ha sido miembro del directorio de algunas de las compa\u00f1\u00edas m\u00e1s grandes de Chile incluidas LAN, Endesa, D&S y Vi\u00f1a San Pedro Tarapac\u00e1.<\/P> \u201cEste es un ejemplo fant\u00e1stico de lo que puede hacer un directorio independiente\u201d, comenta Lagos.<\/P> Seg\u00fan Guajardo, la alta gerencia de Codelco sol\u00eda sufrir de duplicaci\u00f3n de roles y confusas cadenas de \u00f3rdenes, pero Hern\u00e1ndez est\u00e1 cambiando las cosas.<\/P> Es cierto que la incorporaci\u00f3n de sangre nueva podr\u00eda verse limitada por los l\u00edmites salariales del sector p\u00fablico -el propio Hern\u00e1ndez habr\u00eda aceptado un fuerte recorte salarial para unirse a Codelco- pero eso no impidi\u00f3 que el presidente ejecutivo de la cupr\u00edfera reclutara a Rodrigo Toro y Thomas Keller, dos experimentados ejecutivos mineros, para dirigir los departamentos de marketing y finanzas de la firma, respectivamente.<\/P> A\u00fan m\u00e1s importante para la renovaci\u00f3n de Codelco que estas nuevas caras ser\u00e1 la relaci\u00f3n que la nueva administraci\u00f3n logre con el Gobierno de Pi\u00f1era.<\/P> A\u00fan cuando el gobierno corporativo busca limitar la influencia pol\u00edtica, el Estado sigue siendo el \u00fanico accionista de Codelco y tiene la \u00faltima palabra en temas clave, en especial en los financieros.<\/P> Manejando a los Trabajadores<\/STRONG><\/P> Una de las primeras tareas de Hern\u00e1ndez ser\u00e1 establecer una buena relaci\u00f3n con los 19.000 trabajadores que conforman la fuerza laboral de la compa\u00f1\u00eda, lo que ser\u00e1 crucial para el \u00e9xito de su administraci\u00f3n.<\/P> \u201cComo en el f\u00fatbol, el gerente tiene que ser el gerente y los jugadores, los jugadores. Si los jugadores quieren administrar, y ha habido algunos casos de esto, entonces no funciona\u201d, afirma Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/P> En general, los sueldos de Codelco son comparables con las rivales del sector privado y, si bien la sobredotaci\u00f3n existe, no es generalizada, destaca.<\/P> No obstante, hay espacio para mejorar la eficiencia. Los trabajadores de la empresa est\u00e1n entre los mejor pagados de Chile a\u00fan cuando su productividad es menor que en grandes minas de propiedad privada, se\u00f1ala Lagos.<\/P> Pero Raimundo Espinoza, presidente de la Federaci\u00f3n de Trabajadores del Cobre y representante de los trabajadores en el directorio de Codelco, advierte en contra de tales comparaciones dado que las condiciones en dos minas nunca son exactamente iguales.<\/P> \u201cLos trabajadores de Codelco disfrutan de derechos y beneficios ganados durante d\u00e9cadas\u201d, afirma.<\/P> A\u00fan as\u00ed, algunos de estos beneficios, en especial aquellos que no son costo-eficientes o atractivos para empleados m\u00e1s j\u00f3venes, podr\u00edan reestructurarse para ahorrar dinero, argumenta Lagos. Por ejemplo, la protecci\u00f3n gratuita de la salud, que es muy costosa, podr\u00eda ser reemplazada por un seguro privado.<\/P> Sin embargo, los trabajadores sindicalizados de Codelco no son los \u00fanicos que exigen mejores condiciones. Son superados en n\u00famero por cerca de 30.000 trabajadores subcontratados que entregan una multitud de servicios a Codelco, desde seguridad y servicios de alimentaci\u00f3n hasta construcci\u00f3n y transporte.<\/P> En el 2007, un peque\u00f1o grupo de ellos lanz\u00f3 una devastadora campa\u00f1a de violentas protestas que cost\u00f3 a la compa\u00f1\u00eda millones de d\u00f3lares hasta que esta acord\u00f3 mejorar el salario y las condiciones.<\/P> Si los precios del cobre siguen altos, el problema podr\u00eda resurgir, pero los trabajadores podr\u00edan encontrar dificultades en negociar con la nueva administraci\u00f3n.<\/P> Codelco no deber\u00eda ser administrada como una empresa privada, se\u00f1ala Hern\u00e1ndez, \u201cpero puede ser bien administrada\u201d, lo que significa mantener bajos los costos e invertir m\u00e1s en producci\u00f3n.<\/P> Dados los miles de millones de d\u00f3lares que Codelco ha ganado para Chile, es s\u00f3lo justo y sensato, que el Gobierno permita a la compa\u00f1\u00eda invertir parte de sus ganancias a fin de asegurar su capacidad de seguir produciendo cobre en las d\u00e9cadas que est\u00e1n por venir.<\/P> Tom Azzopardi<\/STRONG> trabaja como periodista freelance en Santiago<\/P> Thanks to soaring prices and booming demand in China and other emerging economies, Chile\u2019s giant state-owned copper company Codelco, the world\u2019s largest producer of the malleable metal, has seen its profits rocket to levels unthinkable a decade ago.<\/p>\n And it\u2019s not just copper. A global commodities boom means that prices of other metals produced by Codelco, including molybdenum, gold and silver, have also hit record levels. As a result, Chile\u2019s cash cow earned more than US$27 billion in 2005-2008, more than in the previous 18 years combined.<\/p>\n The collapse in global financial markets sent copper prices plummeting from almost US$4 a pound in mid-2008 to less than US$1.50 a pound. But thanks largely to record demand from China, the world\u2019s largest consumer of the metal, prices have rebounded over the last 18 months to pre-crisis levels.<\/p>\n That\u2019s good news for Chile since the state receives all of Codelco\u2019s earnings either in the form of taxes, net profits or the Copper Reserve Law, a legacy of the Pinochet government, which gives 10% of the company\u2019s revenues to the Armed Forces.<\/p>\n With billions of copper-dollars rolling in, Chile has been able to finance a major reform of its pension system and one of the world\u2019s largest economic stimulus packages, relative to the size of the economy. The copper boom has also left the government of President Sebastian Pi\u00f1era in good shape to tackle the huge task of rebuilding schools, homes and hospitals flattened by last February\u2019s earthquake.<\/p>\n But, while Codelco\u2019s bottom-line results have been spectacular, many say that high profits have masked the company\u2019s worsening situation on the ground.<\/p>\n This is, in part, due to production costs that have been rising almost as fast as copper prices, although this is not a problem unique to Codelco, said Gustavo Lagos, director of the Catholic University\u2019s Center for Mining.<\/p>\n When prices rise, mining companies rush to lift production, pushing up demand, and prices, for a myriad of goods and services from dump trucks and their huge tires to geologists and electricity.<\/p>\n But Codelco\u2019s costs are rising faster than at other mining companies. \u201cThis is a major loss of competitiveness\u2026 Codelco is much more exposed to low price cycles than before,\u201d said Lagos.<\/p>\n And higher costs aren\u2019t the only problem. In 2009, Codelco posted a 16% jump in copper production to more than 1.7 million tons due to the start-up of its new Gaby mine, but the rise follows years of sliding production as its operations age and ore grades fall.<\/p>\n The company\u2019s mines, some of which have been in production for more than a century, are desperately in need of investment to continue exploiting huge mineral reserves.<\/p>\n \u201cWe have to use part of our cash-flow to keep the company healthy,\u201d said Diego Hern\u00e1ndez, Codelco\u2019s new chief executive officer.<\/p>\n Recent projects like Gaby and Radomiro Tomic should maintain production at current levels through 2012, but if Codelco fails to carry out a series of huge structural projects at its main divisions, production will collapse within the next five years to around 900,000 tons a year, or just over half of current output, warns Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/p>\n This outlook is the result of serious under-investment over the last decade. Crucial projects have been repeatedly delayed so that the company must now pack a decade worth of investment into the next five years, said Juan Carlos Guajardo, executive director of Santiago\u2019s Center for Copper and Mining Studies (CESCO).<\/p>\n \u201cThese should have been better distributed over time, instead they have piled up and have to be done all at once now,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n Investing in productivity<\/strong><\/p>\n Codelco\u2019s board has approved a US$15 billion investment plan in the next five years to increase productivity but it has yet to determine where this money will come from.<\/p>\n This plan is supposed to include a record US$2.4 billion investment this year, but the government has refused to reinvest US$378 million from Codelco\u2019s 2009 profits, blaming the cost of post-earthquake reconstruction.<\/p>\n The company could raise additional funds by issuing up to US$500 million in debt or selling non-core assets, such as its 40 percent stake in northern Chilean power generator E-CL, formerly known as Edelnor, he said.<\/p>\n In this way, Codelco should be able to finance this year\u2019s investment portfolio without reinvesting any profits, but the government will have to reinvest some of the company\u2019s profits in coming years to fund future investments.<\/p>\n \u201cReinvesting profits is standard practice in the mining industry,\u201d said Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/p>\n But Chilean governments have a poor record of doing just that. Since its creation, Codelco has been allowed to reinvest just 3% of its profits.<\/p>\n That needs to change to avoid a dramatic drop in copper output and consequently Codelco\u2019s financial performance, warns Lagos.<\/p>\n According to Codelco\u2019s website, large projects at its El Teniente, Chuquicamata, Andina and Ministro Hales mines are scheduled to be brought into production in quick succession from the middle of this decade onwards.<\/p>\n If these projects are successful, Codelco should be able to lift its production to around two million tons a year, thereby ensuring the company\u2019s production for decades to come, said Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/p>\n \u201cWe have to invest now so that production can continue at this level and eventually rise,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n Despite the huge task ahead, Hern\u00e1ndez is confident that Codelco, with decades of operational experience behind it, has the professional abilities to succeed.<\/p>\n \u201cWe are the inheritors of 105 years of mining tradition and know-how, so yes, we have the capacity,\u201d he added.<\/p>\n Corporate governance<\/strong><\/p>\n But there is concern that a lack of independent leadership has been holding Codelco back. This is, in part, due to the circumstances surrounding the foundation of the company.<\/p>\n General Augusto Pinochet created the company in 1976 mainly out of assets that were expropriated during the nationalization of the country\u2019s copper mines five years earlier under the government of Salvador Allende.<\/p>\n With a strong executive president holding almost all the power, the board of directors was designed to act more as advisors than overseers. This model was effective in consolidating the country\u2019s mines in the 1970s, but left little room for modern corporate notions of transparency and accountability.<\/p>\n Responsibility for the company\u2019s performance now lies with a board of fixed-term directors with the power to hire and fire the chief executive as they see fit. The finance and mining ministers no longer sit on the nine-member board, which is comprised of three presidential appointees balanced by four independent directors, chosen in the same way as senior civil servants, and two workers representatives.<\/p>\n The reform did not go as far as some would have liked. On the campaign trail, President Pi\u00f1era said he would sell a 20% stake in Codelco, claiming that only the involvement of private capital could really improve the company\u2019s failing productivity.<\/p>\n Chile would not be the first country in the region to go down this road. In Brazil, the partial privatization of state-owned mining firm CVRD, now renamed Vale, and energy behemoth Petrobras, has helped transform them into global giants.<\/p>\n But President Pi\u00f1era has shelved this plan for now, while calling on workers and executives to build \u201ca Codelco for the 21st Century.\u201d<\/p>\n The changes at Codelco may seem intangible compared to the dirty work of blasting and hauling ore, but their potential impact should not be underestimated, especially in limiting political influence, argues Guajardo.<\/p>\n Until now, he suggests, political allegiance has been an important factor in Codelco appointments \u201calmost all the way from the boardroom to the rock face.\u201d<\/p>\n But as a result of its new corporate governance, Codelco\u2019s decisions should be taken with only the company\u2019s best interests in mind, said Guajardo.<\/p>\n Under new management<\/strong><\/p>\n It is still early days, but the new board\u2019s first appointments have raised optimism about the company\u2019s future.<\/p>\n Previous chief executives have come from Chile\u2019s political elite, but Diego Hern\u00e1ndez joins Codelco after a highly successful career in the private sector including stints at all four of the world\u2019s largest mining groups: Anglo American, Rio Tinto, Vale and, most recently, BHP Billiton, where he was head of the company\u2019s global base metals division.<\/p>\n In addition, newly-elected chairman Gerardo Jofre is a former banking executive at Santander who has sat on the board of some of Chile\u2019s biggest firms including LAN, Endesa, D&S and Vi\u00f1a San Pedro Tarapac\u00e1.<\/p>\n \u00a0\u201cThis is a fantastic example of what an independent board can do,\u201d says Lagos.<\/p>\n According to Guajardo, Codelco\u2019s senior management used to suffer duplication of roles and confused chains of command, but Hern\u00e1ndez is shaking things up.<\/p>\n It\u2019s true that bringing in new blood could be hindered by public sector wage caps – Hern\u00e1ndez himself reportedly took a hefty wage cut to join Codelco – but that didn\u2019t stop the chief executive recruiting Rodrigo Toro and Thomas Keller, two experienced mining executives, to run the firm\u2019s marketing and finance departments respectively.<\/p>\n Even more important for Codelco\u2019s renewal than these new faces will be the relationship the new management strikes with the Pi\u00f1era government.<\/p>\n For all that the corporate governance reforms seek to limit political influence, the state remains Codelco\u2019s sole shareholder and has the final say on critical issues, especially financial ones.<\/p>\n Managing the workers<\/strong><\/p>\n One of Hern\u00e1ndez\u2019s first tasks will be to establish a good relationship with the company\u2019s 19,000-strong workforce that will be crucial to the success of his administration.<\/p>\n \u201cAs in football, the manager has to be the manager and the players, the players. If the players want to manage, and there have been some cases of this, then it doesn\u2019t work,\u201d said Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/p>\n Codelco\u2019s overall wage bill is comparable with private sector rivals and, while overstaffing exists, it is not generalized, he noted.<\/p>\n Still, there is room to improve efficiency. The company\u2019s workers are amongst the best paid in Chile even though their productivity is lower than at large privately-owned mines, said Lagos.<\/p>\n But Raimundo Espinoza, head of the Copper Workers Federation and a workers\u2019 representative on Codelco\u2019s board, warns against such comparisons since conditions at no two mines are exactly the same.<\/p>\n \u201cCodelco\u2019s workers enjoy rights and benefits won over decades,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n Even so, some of these benefits, especially those which are not cost-effective or attractive to younger employees, could be restructured to save money, argues Lagos. For example, free healthcare, which is very expensive, could be replaced by private insurance.<\/p>\n But Codelco\u2019s unionized workers are not the only ones demanding better conditions. They are outnumbered by around 30,000 employees of subcontractors providing a multitude of services to Codelco, from security and catering to construction and transport.<\/p>\n In 2007, a small group of them launched a devastating campaign of violent protests that cost the company millions of dollars until it agreed to improve pay and conditions.<\/p>\n If copper prices remain high, the issue could return, but workers may find it harder to negotiate with the new management.<\/p>\n Codelco should not be run as a private company, said Hern\u00e1ndez, \u201cbut it can be run well,\u201d which means keeping costs down and investing more in production.<\/p>\n Given the billions of dollars Codelco has earned for Chile, it is only fair, and sensible, that the government allows the company to invest some of its profits to ensure its ability to keep producing copper for decades to come.<\/p>\n Tom Azzopardi<\/strong> is a freelance journalist based in Santiago<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Gracias a los crecientes precios y el auge de la demanda tanto de China como de otras econom\u00edas emergentes, la cupr\u00edfera estatal chilena Codelco, el mayor productor mundial del metal maleable, ha visto como sus ganancias se dispararon a niveles impensables hace una d\u00e9cada.<\/P> Y no es s\u00f3lo el cobre. Un auge mundial de los bienes b\u00e1sicos implica que los precios de otros metales producidos por Codelco, incluidos el molibdeno, el oro y la plata, tambi\u00e9n han alcanzado niveles r\u00e9cord.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"template":"","news_tax":[],"user_type":[],"class_list":["post-4328","news","type-news","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
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Todo esto ha cambiado en los \u00faltimos seis meses. Como parte del proceso de ingreso de Chile a la Organizaci\u00f3n para la Cooperaci\u00f3n y el Desarrollo Econ\u00f3mico (OCDE), la entonces presidenta Michelle Bachelet promulg\u00f3 una legislaci\u00f3n a fines del 2009 para mejorar el gobierno corporativo de Codelco y hacerla funcionar de manera m\u00e1s parecida a sus rivales de propiedad privada.<\/P>
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Algunos representantes sindicales temen que el nuevo presidente ejecutivo podr\u00eda cambiar el tacto de la anterior estrecha relaci\u00f3n entre la administraci\u00f3n y los sindicatos. Hern\u00e1ndez llega a la estatal con una reputaci\u00f3n de ser un duro negociador; bajo su mando, BHP Billiton soport\u00f3 largas huelgas en importantes minas hasta que los trabajadores acordaron reducir sus demandas. El ejecutivo ya ha indicado que no renovar\u00e1 la Alianza Estrat\u00e9gica, un acuerdo marco con los trabajadores que ha regido las relaciones laborales en Codelco desde 1994.<\/P>
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Codelco can finance around US$1.6 billion of its investment plan through cashflow by depreciating the value of its assets, but this is not enough to cover all investments, said Hern\u00e1ndez.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"\/sites\/default\/files\/ING_gustavo_lagos.jpg\")
This has all changed in the last six months. As part of Chile\u2019s accession process to the OECD, then-President Michelle Bachelet promulgated legislation in late 2009 to improve Codelco\u2019s corporate governance and make it run more like its privately-owned rivals.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"\/sites\/default\/files\/ING_raimundo_espinoza.jpg\")
Some union officials fear the new chief executive could change tact from the previously close relationship between management and unions. He comes with a reputation as a tough negotiator; under his watch, BHP Billiton endured lengthy strikes at major mines until workers agreed to soften their demands. He has already indicated that he will not renew the Strategic Alliance, a framework agreement with workers that has governed labor relations at Codelco since 1994.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"\/sites\/default\/files\/ING-GRAF-CODELCO-1.jpg\")
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